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ABSTRACT
As Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is adopted as a means of
voice communications over the next decade there may be serious
national security consequences. At present, VoIP service
providers have difficulty connecting users to local "9-1-1" call
centers. In addition, law enforcement officials may not have the
legal authority or technical capability to monitor criminal
communications over VolP. An even greater concern to public
safety and national security exists in the very practice of sending
voice and data over the same lines. The convergence of formerly
independent communications networks exposes voice to
vulnerabilities, such as Internet viruses and hacking, that were
nonexistent on the public switched telephone network (PSTN).
This risk is especially significant due to the heavy dependence of
critical infrastructure sectors, such as the energy, financial
services industries, and first responders, on reliable voice and data
communications. VolP is replete with promise, but security issues
must be addressed or its economic benefits could be lost in the
wake of a malicious attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of relative obscurity, Voice-over-Internet Protocol
(VoIP) telephony appears ready to go mainstream. VoIP is likely to
become the primary means of voice communications within the next
decade, given its considerable economic advantages over traditional
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telecommunications services. Individual consumers see VolP as an
opportunity to lower their monthly bills, because VolP is currently free
from government regulations that otherwise raise service fees for
customers. Businesses reap the cost savings, too. They are also
attracted by VoP's current and next-generation functional abilities,
such as integrated voice and email messaging and people-finder
capabilities, which can increase operational efficiency. For
communications service providers, VoIP is a way to get more "bang
for their buck" by leveraging existing wireline networks to pull
double-duty for voice and data communications. The federal
government views VoP as a boon to achieving nationwide broadband
deployment goals.
Largely unnoticed in the rush to VoP adoption is the fact that
unmoderated embrace of VoP has serious national security
consequences. With current technology, VoP service providers have
difficulty connecting users to local "9-1-1" call centers, and almost
certainly cannot guarantee that the receiving center will match the
user's location. In addition, law enforcement officials may not have
the legal authority or technical capability to monitor criminal
communications over VolP. These problems, like others concerning
universal service and interconnection requirements in the
telecommunications arena, have been the subject of substantial public
debate by federal regulators and lawmakers.
An even greater concern to public safety and national security, and
one which has received less public attention, exists in the very practice
of sending voice and data over the same lines. The convergence of
formerly independent communications networks exposes voice to
vulnerabilities, such as Internet viruses and hacking, that were
nonexistent on the public switched telephone network (PSTN). This
risk is especially significant due to the heavy dependence of critical
infrastructure sectors, such as the energy, financial services industries,
and first responders, on reliable voice and data communications. VoP
is replete with promise, but security issues must be addressed or its
economic benefits could be lost in the wake of a malicious attack.
II. VoP TECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
A. AN OVERVIEW OF VoIP TECHNOLOGY
VoIP services work much like traditional data transmission: voice
sounds are broken down into binary code, distributed across data
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networks, and reassembled at the receiver's location.' This process
differs from traditional communications over the PSTN, which
requires a single dedicated logical connection between beginning and
end users for the duration of the call. The practice of sending voice as
data over the Internet "is a relatively old concept, in Internet years."
3
Only recently, however, have improvements in the underlying
technology brought VolP to the level of maturity that makes
widespread consumer adoption possible. 4  As a result, the public
network (PN), which formerly consisted of logically separate
communications and data networks, sharing only common
transmission facilities, now "increasingly consists of converged
networks ... [with] circuit switched networks interoperating with
broadband packet-based Internet Protocol (IP) networks."5
The mode of connecting users and the degree of interconnection
with the PSTN differs between VolP service providers. As Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) Chairman
Michael Powell observed in February 2004:
Some of these Internet voice services will be delivered over
the public Internet; others will use Internet protocols over
private networks to reach end-users. Some of these services
will be Internet-only applications; others will allow Internet
'See FCC.coM, Voice Over Internet Protocol Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.fcc.gov/voip (last accessed May 24, 2004) ("VolP converts the voice signal from
your telephone into a digital signal that travels over the internet then converts it back at the
other end.
2 Cf. Nicholas Thompson, Sir, to Whom May I Direct Your Free Call?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2003, at §3, p. 1 ("In the regular phone network, calls initially pass over less efficient copper
wires and the phone companies must maintain dedicated connections between users.
3 Lisa Guernsey, The Web Discovers Its Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1999, at G8 (noting that
"Internet telephony companies have been converting sound into data packets since the mid
1990's.
4 See Barnaby J. Feder, Judge Says Minnesota Cannot Regulate Internet Calls, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2003, at C8 ("The new voice technology is being driven by improvements in
microelectronics that allow Internet networks to break voice traffic up into digital data packets
and deliver it around the globe without the interruptions and sacrifices in voice quality that
hampered early versions.").
5 THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMITrEE,
CONVERGENCE TASK FORCE REPORT (2001), available at http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/reports/
2001/ConvergenceReport-Final.htm (last accessed July 8, 2004) [hereinafter NSTAC CTF
REPORT].
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callers to reach out to users on the public switched
telecommunications network. Some will be pay services;
others will be free or simple add-ons to other types of
applications. All, however, will enhance our ability to
communicate with each other.6
B. FACTORS DRIVING VoIP ADOPTION
In addition to improvements in quality of service, other factors
have played a significant role in driving the recent push toward
widespread VolP adoption. One factor, which is perhaps too often
credited, is the lack of regulatory oversight of VolP service providers.
The FCC is currently considering whether VoIP service providers
should be subject to traditional telecommunication requirements, but
has not yet regulated providers as it regulates traditional
telecommunications.7  Similarly, although Minnesota8 and New York9
6 Hearing on Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science & Transp., 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed.
Communications Comm'n), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/
DOC-244231A l.pdf (last accessed Aug. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Powell Statement].
7 See generally FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, IN THE MATTER OF IP-ENABLED SERVICES
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-28A1 .pdf (last accessed Sept. 17, 2004) [hereinafter IP-
ENABLED SERVS. NPRM]. To date, the FCC has issued only two decisions concerning the
applicability of economic regulations to VolP. In February 2004, concurrent with the issuance
of the broader NPRM cited above, the FCC examined pulver.com's "Free World Dialup"
(FWD), a limited VolP service that provides "free communications over the Internet between
one on-line FWD member using a broadband connection and other on-line FWD members
using a broadband connection." FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, IN THE MATTER OF PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RULING THAT PULVER.COM'S FREE WORLD DIALuP IS NEITHER
TELECOMMUNICATIONS NOR A TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE 2 n.3 (2004), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-04-27AI .pdf (last accessed Sept. 17,
2004) [hereinafter FWD DECLARATORY RULING]. The Commission determined that the
service provided by FWD was neither "telecommunications" nor "telecommunications
service" and thus not subject to FCC regulatory requirements. See id. at 6-7. In April 2004,
the Commission considered a substantially different application of VoIP technology by
AT&T. AT&T petitioned the Commission to exempt its practice of converting calls initiated
on the PSTN to IP format for transport over AT&T's Internet backbone before reconstituting
the data on the PSTN again for the end-user. See FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, IN THE
MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING THAT AT&T's PHONE-TO-PHONE IP
TELEPHONY SERVICES ARE EXEMPT FROM ACCESS CHARGES 1 (2004), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-97Al .pdf (last accessed Sept. 17,
2004). The FCC denied the petition, determining that AT&T's specific process is a
telecommunications service covered by Commission regulations. See id. at 9.
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have attempted to introduce performance requirements for VolP
providers, most states have not yet addressed whether their own
regulatory programs should be extended to VolP. In fact, the FCC is
likely to contest those that attempt to do so. 0 This regulatory void has
created an arbitrage opportunity in which VoIP service providers can
provide nearly the same product as traditional telecommunications
companies at reduced cost, producing savings that can be passed on to
customers.1 In addition, the lack of regulatory costs creates lower
entry fees for startup VolP providers, with the resulting competition
further driving down consumer prices.i2
8 In September 2003, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (MNPUC) ordered Vonage,
a VolP service provider, to comply with Minnesota's statutes and regulations concerning the
offering of telephone service. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 290 F.
Supp. 2d 993, 996 (D. Minn. 2003). The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota subsequently enjoined the MNPUC from regulating Vonage's VolP services,
concluding that "[s]tate regulation would effectively decimate Congress's mandate that the
Internet remain unfettered by regulation." Id. at 994.
9 See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, PSC: Vonage is a Telephone Corporation
as Defined by NYS Law 2 (May 19, 2004), available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/
WebFileRoom.nsf/ArticlesByCategory/06086843A52CFBF085256E990060FC3B/$File/prO4
038.pdfOpenElement (last accessed Aug. 13, 2004). The New York Public Service
Commission determined that Vonage, a VolP service provider, "owns and manages equipment
that is used to provide telephone service to Vonage's customers and to connect Vonage's
customers to the customers of other telephone corporations via their public networks and thus,
like other owners of telecommunications-provisioning equipment, is subject to the NYS Public
Service Law." Id.
1 See Griff Witte, Few Rules Better for Calls on Internet, Powell Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 25,
2004, at E2 ("Although some states have initiated regulations, the FCC has shown signs of late
that it intends to take the lead in determining how VolP is handled. ). See also Ellen
Muraskin, FCC's Powell Reassures VOIP Community, EWEEK.COM, June 23, 2004
(discussing FCC Chairman Michael Powell's position "'that those individual states that have
taken an aggressive posture on regulating VOIP as a telecom service are making a mistake,
since IP networks, like the railroads, are national and even global entities'), at
http://www.eweek.comarticle2/0%2C1759%2C1616394%2COO.asp (last accessed Apr. 22,
2005).
" See Chdrie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation on the Horizon: Are Regulators Poised
to Address the Status of IP Telephony?, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 19 (2003).
12 Powell Statement, supra note 6, at 6 ("[H]ungry, free radical entrepreneurs and software
developers are taking advantage of extremely low entry barriers to pour investments into
service offerings .... Lower entry and transaction costs are allowing Internet voice services to
be offered at low prices, in some instances, for free.").
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Beyond regulatory freedom, VoIP's enhanced communications
features are also fueling its adoption.1 3  Current VolP services offer
"multimedia and unified messaging capabilities ... [that] are not
available over traditional local and long-distance service.'
14
Meanwhile, next generation VoIP networks will leverage "the ubiquity
of IP as a networking technology ... [to deploy] a vast range of
innovative converged voice and data services that simply cannot be
cost effectively supported over today's PSTN infrastructure."'
15
Operational efficiency is also a significant driver for VolP
adoption. For communications providers, the business rationale is
simple: 16  VoIP "leverages data network capacity[,] removing the
requirement to operate separate voice and data networks."' 7
13 Hearing on Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science & Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Kevin Werbach, Founder, Supernova
Group LLC) (explaining that VoIP has grown not due to regulatory arbitrage, but "because it's
a better technology ... [that] is more efficient, and more flexible, than the legacy circuit-
switched technology"), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfn?id=1065&wit-id=2993 (last accessed Aug. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Werbach
Statement].
14 Lisa Pierce, Commentary: Heads Up VoIP - Regulation Incoming, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr.
8, 2004, at http://news.com.com/2030-7352-5188097.html (last accessed June 10, 2004). For
example, Vonage customers can utilize web based voicemail retrieval and online features
management. Hearing on Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transp., 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (statement of Jeffrey Citron, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer, Vonage Holdings Corp.), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/citron022404.pdf (last accessed Aug. 13, 2004).
15 MULTISERVICE SWITCHING FORUM, MSF TECHNICAL REPORT: NEXT-GENERATION VoIP
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 5 (2003), available at http://www.msforum.org/techinfo/reports/
MSF-TR-ARCH-001-FINAL.pdf (last accessed July 8, 2004) [hereinafter MSF TECHNICAL
REPORT]. (According to their website, "[t]he MultiService Forum (MSF) is a global
association of service providers and system suppliers committed to developing and promoting
open-architecture, multiservice switching systems ... MSF's activities include developing
implementation agreements, promoting worldwide compatibility and interoperability, and
encouraging input to appropriate national and international standards bodies." MultiService
Forum, About MSF: Who We Are, at http://www.msforum.org/about/who.shtml (last accessed
Sept. 17, 2004)).
16 See Michael A. Hiltzik, A New Calling for the Net, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 29, 2000, at
Al (quoting Noam Bardin, chief executive of DeltaThree, a telecommunications company:
"'Today [there are] two networks .... One does everything, and the other does only voice.
That means the phone network has no real technological reason to be around in the future."').
17 MSF TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
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Furthermore, equipment used to run VoIP is often faster and cheaper
than traditional telephony equipment.18
Given the quality of service and economic rationales driving end-
user adoption, more and more companies are beginning to offer VoIP.
Startup VoIP providers are experiencing rapid growth, and the major
telephone,20  cable, 21 and even computer technology 22 firms are
establishing the technological foundations for future nationwide
service. VoIP may prove to be the "killer app" that drives broadband
access and enrollment across the United States.2 3  Yet VolP is not
without its drawbacks, some of which have been the subject of intense
debate among federal regulators and lawmakers.
III. CURRENTLY-IDENTIFIED VoiP PUBLIC SAFETY ISSUES
In February 2004, FCC Chairman Michael Powell identified
several key public safety issues surrounding VolP in which federal
18 id.
19 For example, in February 2004, Vonage activated its 100,000th line, just 5 months after
having activated its 50,000th line. Hearing on Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Jeffrey
Citron, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Vonage Holdings Corp.), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/citron022404.pdf (last accessed Aug. 13, 2004) [hereinafter
Citron Statement].
20 see, e.g., Press Release, AT&T, Dorman Outlines Aggressive, Continuing transformation of
AT&T as the "World's Networking Company" (Feb. 25, 2004) (discussing AT&T's plans to
provide VolP in one hundred markets nationwide by the end of 2004), at http://www.att.com/
news/2004/02/25-12936.
21 See, e.g., Hearing on Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Glenn Britt, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Time Warner Cable) (discussing his company's plans to provide
VolP service "throughout the majority of the Time Warner Cable footprint by the end of
2004"), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfim?id=1065&wit-id=2990 (last accessed Aug. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Britt
Statement].
22 See, e.g., Keith Regan, IBM, Cisco Ally for VoIP Push, TECHNEWSWORLD.COM, May 18,
2004 (discussing a partnership between IBM and Cisco Systems to work together on future
VoIP projects), at http://www.technewsworld.com/story/33848.html (last accessed May 21,
2004).
23 See Powell Statement, supra note 6, at 2 ("Just as email and e-commerce were drivers of the
narrowband Internet, higher bandwidth applications like ... Internet voice will be the 'killer
apps' for broadband.").
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government action may be necessary, including 9-1 -1 and law
enforcement access.24  Although not the focus of this paper, these
issues are briefly summarized below.
A. "9-1 -1" / "E9-1 -1" CAPABILITIES
Two primary concerns have been identified regarding VolP's "9-1-
1" and "E9-1-1" capabilities: (1) callers may not be able to connect to
9-1-1 dispatch centers; and (2) there is no guarantee that callers'
location information is correct when sent to a 9-1-1 dispatch center
from a VoIP system.25
In order for VoP service providers to connect to dedicated lines on
the PSTN for a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP), they must
obtain interconnection with incumbent local exchange carriers
(LECs).26 Some LECs have refused to cooperate with VoIP services
in providing 9-1-1 access. 27 Confusion about source locations results
from the portability of VoIP services: "[m]ost IP telephones can be
easily moved from one LAN port to another without reprogramming
... [which] can cause problems if the physical location of the
telephone is different from the location reported to emergency
personnel.,
28
A variety of solutions have emerged to address this problem. As
an interim fix, some VolP providers include an express disclaimer
about their 9-1-1 connection limitations.29 Others suggest maintaining
emergency telephones connected to the PSAP through traditional
telephone lines at various points in the caller's building.3 ° The FCC
24 Powell Statement, supra note 6, at 9.
25 See supra note 1 ("It may be difficult for some Internet Voice services to seamlessly
connect [sic] with the 911 dispatch center or identify the location of Internet Voice 911
callers.").
26 Citron Statement, supra note 19, at 8.
27 See id.
2 8 HEWLETT PACKARD, TECHNICAL BRIEF: NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE: GETTING STARTED
wrrH VoIP 5 (2003), available at http://h4111 l.www4.hp.com/procurve/uk/en/pdfs/
final voiptechbrief.pdf (last accessed April 4, 2005) [hereinafter HP TECHNICAL BRIEF].
29 See, e.g., Citron Statement, supra note 19, at 9 ("Vonage makes the limitations inherent in
its 911 service clear to all Vonage customers.").
30See HP TECHNICAL BRIEF, supra note 28, at 5.
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and States such as Minnesota are considering government action to
ensure 9-1-1/E9-1-1 availability for VoIP users.31  VolP service
providers recognize that their technology might ultimately produce
better 9-1-1 service than current offerings on the PSTN, and that this
functionality might prove a selling point.32 Thus, VolP providers have
incentives beyond regulatory requirement to invest in future 9-1-1 and
E9-1-1 capabilities.3 3
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO VoIP CONVERSATIONS
Another hotly contested issue in recent months has been the debate
surrounding whether VolP service providers must comply with the
31 IP-ENABLED SERVS. NPRM, supra note 7, at 38 ("Assuming that [the FCC] fmd[s that] IP-
enabled services in general or certain services in particular to [sic] fall within [its] E9 11
'scope' criteria, [the FCC] seek[s] comment on how best to achieve [its] policy objectives for
ensuring the availability of 911 and E91 1 capability."). The E91 1 Scope Criteria used by the
FCC to determine whether communications providers should be subject to 91 I/E91 1
regulation include:
(1) the entity offers real-time, two-way switched voice service, interconnected with the
[PSTN] ... ;
(2) customers using the service or device have a reasonable expectation of access to 911 and
enhanced 911 services; (3) the service competes with traditional CMRS or wireline local
exchange service; and (4) it is technically and operationally feasible for the service or device
to support E91 1.
Id.
32 See Citron Statement, supra note 19, at 8 ("[U]ltimately VoIP will offer consumers and
emergency workers more functionality than the services of today. For example ... emergency
workers may be able to instantly and seamlessly access that customer's medical history, while
at the same time a separate message could notify the customer's primary physician or family
members of the emergency situation.").
33 Ongoing technological developments can certainly address the quality of 9-1-1 offerings,
provided the market adopts them. For instance, current efforts under way at the National
Emergency Number Association and at the Internet Engineering Task Force are developing
standards for providing location information in conjunction with an IP address. Separately,
telecommunications giant Verizon recently announced that it would "provide Voice-over-
Internet-Protocol (VoIP) service providers and their vendors the ability to use Verizon's
Enhanced 911 emergency calling system to connect VoIP customer 911 calls to Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs)." Press Release, Verizon, Verizon Identifies Solution Enabling
VoIP Companies to Connect to E 911 Emergency Calling System (Apr. 26, 2005), available
at http://newscenter.verizon.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=90778 (last accessed
May 12, 2005). These efforts, among a host of others, indicate that VoIP providers are acutely
aware of the need to offer 9-1-1 and E-9- 1-1 capabilities.
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Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).34
CALEA establishes requirements for telecommunications carriers to
intercept customers' communications, and to provide law enforcement
access to the intercepted communications pursuant to a court order or
other lawful authorization.35 VolP services pose two problems for
CALEA compliance. After prolonged uncertainty,36 the Federal
Communications Commission has recently ruled that VolP should, in
fact, be classified as a "telecommunications service" 37 rather than an
"information service' 38 as defined by the Telecommunications Act.
Therefore, the Telecommunications Act covers VolP and requires that
VoIP providers support CALEA. This resolution, however, comes
after VoP protocols have already been in place in a non-compliant
mode, leading to a second, and perhaps more significant, compliance
34 For example, in his statement concerning the FCC's decision that "pulver.com" was an
unregulated information source, Commissioner Michael J. Copps stated that he "would dissent
to this item purely on law enforcement and national security grounds. The Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) expressly exempts entities providing
information services from complying with law assistance capability requirements. No
assurances from companies ... have yet demonstrated a satisfactory solution to this thorny
problem." FWD DECLARATORY RULING, supra note 7, at 24.
" See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000).
36 Compare ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER IN THE MATTER OF COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACT JOINT PETITION FOR RULEMAKING 3 (2004) ("[t]he language of CALEA ...
unambiguously excludes information services such as e-mail and Internet access"), available
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/calea/caleacomment4.12.04.pdf (last accessed Aug.
13, 2004) [hereinafter EPIC COMMENTS] with Kiser & Collins, supra note 11, at 32 ("A
finding that IP telephony is an information service ... would not necessarily relieve providers
from complying with CALEA .... [T]he [FCC] has authority under CALEA to reach any
provider of 'wire or electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent
that ... such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange
service."').
37 "Telecommunications service" is defined as "the offering of telecommunications for a fee
directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the
public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000). "Telecommunications"
is defined as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information
of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received." 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).
38 "Information service" is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any
such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or
the management of a telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
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challenge: the ability of Vol service providers to comply with
CALEA requests is uncertain. VolP decouples the voice application
from the underlying transmission facilities; "the provider that
interfaces with the end-user may only have access to call routing
information" and would be unable to comply with law enforcement
requests for call content.3 9 And due to the packetized nature of VoWP
data transmission, when call content is available to law enforcement,
the voice data packets sought by law enforcement may be jumbled
with innocent third party content, raising privacy concerns.
Ultimately, some form of VolP compliance with CALEA will
likely be required. Law enforcement 4 1 and business leaders42 are
(understandably) concerned that VoIP not become a "safe haven" for
criminal and terrorist communications, beyond the purview of lawful
surveillance. Federal regulators43 and lawmakers 44 currently are
39 See Werbach Statement, supra note 13.
40 EPIC COMMENTS, supra note 36, at 6 ("[S]urveillance conducted in packet-mode
environments can result - and indeed has resulted - in the unauthorized capture of third-party
communications.").
41 In a June 2004 hearing on VoIP legislation, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Laura
Parsky expressed the U.S. Department of Justice's concern that "when it becomes known that
law enforcement has difficulty detecting communications over a particular technology,
criminals quickly migrate to that technology. Hearing on The VOIP Regulatory Freedom Act,
S. 2281, Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Laura Parsky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't
of Justice), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfin?id=1230&witid=3537 (last accessed July 8, 2004) [hereinafter Parsky
Statement].
42 An anonymous senior source in the financial community has indicated to the CIP Program
that terrorists and criminal conspiracies are transferring the bulk of their voice
communications to Internet channels because service providers are not currently required to
comply with CALEA.
43 In August 2004, the FCC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that "tentatively
conclude[d]," among other things, that 'managed' Voice over Internet Protocol ('VolP')
services are subject to CALEA." FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, IN THE MATrER OF
COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT AND BROADBAND ACCESS AND
SERVICES 2 (2004), available at http://www.askcalea.net/docs/20040809.fcc.04-187.pdf (last
accessed Sept. 17, 2004). "Managed" VoIP includes those services whereby the VoWP
provider "manage[s] the communication between its end points and ... provide[s] call set up,
connection, termination, and party identification features .... " Id. at 19.
44 See, e.g., S. 2281, 108th Cong. § 4(c) (2004); H.R. 4129, 108th Cong. § 4(c) (2004).
Although §4(c) was removed as the bill was reported out of committee, the inclusion of the
original language indicates a growing awareness and concern in the legislative branch about
limitations on law enforcement functionality in an age of rapid technical change.
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attempting to address the appropriate means of ensuring law
enforcement access to VoIP communications.
IV. THE NATIONAL SECURITY / CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CONCERN
WITH VoIP
The public safety issues discussed in the preceding section are
important and merit public attention. An even more far-reaching
concern, however - the security implications of converged voice and
data networks - has received considerably less attention from
regulators and lawmakers.45
A. VOIP INTRODUCES VULNERABILITIES TO VOICE COMMUNICATION
The reliability of communications over the PSTN has come to be
taken for granted by Americans. Business and government operate
and are built upon, an assumption of ubiquitous telephone service. 49
VoIP could change both the perception and the reality of ever-present
telephone service because it suffers the same vulnerabilities to
malicious electronic attack as other digital networking technologies.47
VoIP also provides malicious aents with simpler means of reaching
previously inaccessible targets. Four particular vulnerabilities could
45 As the reader will notice from the citations that follow, this paper does not imply that VoIP
security has received no attention at any level of government. In particular, the President's
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) has authored several
relevant task force reports over the last three years on the issue of convergence; however,
these reports discuss convergence issues in the context of an interim period of interoperation
between the PSTN and IP voice networks before full transition to the next generation "all-IP"
network. This paper is distinguished from the NSTAC reports because it focuses on
vulnerabilities of converged voice and data on the same digital backbone - i.e., what the
NSTAC reports refer to as the next generation network (NGN). Nonetheless, many of the
convergence vulnerabilities identified by the NSTAC must also be addressed in the NGN.
46 Hiltzik, supra note 16 (discussing the 99.999%, or "five nines" expected uptime for PSTN
communications).
47 See Jim Louderback, Security Holes Make VOIP a Risky Business, EWEEK.COM, May 12,
2004, at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1591127,00.asp (last accessed Apr. 4, 2005);
see also Matthew Broersma, VOIP's Cry: More Secure Data Nets, EWEEK.COM, June 10,
2004, ("[V]oice running on a company's IP network is just like any other application, with the
same kinds of vulnerabilities and similar processes for ensuring security"), at
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1609840,00.asp (last accessed Apr. 4, 2005).
41 See, e.g., NSTAC CTF REPORT, supra note 5 (discussing concerns that the interoperation of
the PSTN and IP networks could provide "a 'back door' into the control space of the PSTN,
which could enable malicious activities such as insertion of false [signaling] messages").
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prove especially problematic for national and economic security:
(1) susceptibility to a "denial of service" attack; (2) identity spoofing;
(3)power dependence; and, (4) cascading disruptions due to
interconnection of networked systems.
1. DENIAL OF SERVICE IN THE VOICE REALM
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have become all-too-familiar in
Internet computing. 49 A DoS attack basically involves "flood[ing] a
server with packets in an attempt to disrupt service.,' 50  DoS-type
attacks are possible in the PSTN - for example, a malicious actor can
set an autodialer to redial a number repeatedly, thus mimicking the
information overload aspect of an IP-based DoS attack. 51 By putting
voice on IP networks, however, VolP expands the scale of such attacks
while lowering the cost to do so. Rather than targeting one user with
an autodialer, a malicious agent can disrupt all users' ability to make a
VoIP phone call by attacking their service provider's servers. 52
Furthermore, with the increased availability of "user-friendly tools" to
conduct DoS attacks, even "less knowledgeable hackers [can] conduct
attacks with relative ease."53
The network congestion caused by DoS attacks over networks used
by VoIP applications could collaterally, if not directly, impact critical
49 Perhaps the most infamous of these attacks were the "Code Red" worms of 2001, which
exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) Web server software to
install themselves on multiple computer systems, which then participated in a sophisticated
"distributed denial of service" (DDoS) attack on the White House website. The Code Red
worms "illustrated how widespread automated propagation of malicious code has developed
into a means for establishing the foundation for DDoS attacks." THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL
SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NETWORK SECURITY/
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS TASK FORCE REPORT (2002), available at http://www.ncs.gov/
nstac/reports/2002/NSVATF-Report-(FINAL).htm (last accessed Aug. 5, 2004) [hereinafter
NSTAC VATF REPORT].
5o Ellen Muraskin, A Pioneer's View of VOIP and SIP Security, EWEEK.COM, May 17, 2004, at
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1593991,00.asp (last accessed April 4, 2005).
51 See Roger W. Farnsworth, Enterprise Security - an Enabler of VoIP, CONVERGE NETWORK
DIGEST, July 6, 2004, at http://www.convergedigest.com/blueprint/ttp04/
z4cisco2.asp?IfD=141&ctgy=4 (last accessed July 8, 2004).
52 See NSTAC CTF REPORT, supra note 5 ("[A] denial of service (DOS) attack on a particular
ISP could impede data traffic flows, Web site accessibility, and VoIP service availability and
reliability.").
53 NSTAC VATF REPORT, supra note 49.
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national security/emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications. 54
For example, emergency telecommunications access programs, such as
the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS),
may not work properly (as currently conceived) in an all-IP voice
communications network. 55  These programs function by according
higher priority to participants' emer ency communications during
periods of congestion on the PSTN. Priority is determined by
signaling information, which - significantly - "provides call setup and
call services separate from the actual transport of the voice data" on
the PSTN. 57 As the NSTAC observed, VoIP communications - over
IP networks - differ as follows:
[I]n IP networks, the network intelligence data is transmitted
over the same infrastructure as the data itself. Therefore, in
IP-based networks, signaling messages are not accorded any
higher priority than any other data or voice traffic in the
network. During periods of congestion, signaling messages
are as likely to be blocked or dropped as any other messages.
In a converged network, such events could impact
availability and reliability of the GETS service, which relies
on the signaling network for functionality.
58
Such collateral impacts would not only disrupt critical
communications, but might also instigate an emergency event.
5 See id. ("As attack techniques increase in sophistication and intruders continue using DDoS
techniques to exploit vulnerabilities, cyber attacks will likely cause greater collateral
damage.").
55 NSTAC CTF REPORT, supra note 5.
56 See National Communications System, GETS Program Information, at
http://gets.ncs.gov/program_info.html (last accessed Sept. 17, 2004).
57 NSTAC CTF REPORT, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
58 Id. Note that the report's conclusion recommends various mitigation tactics. The feasibility
and horizon of these tactics needs to be explored further.
59 NETwORK RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL VI, HOMELAND SECURITY -
PHYSICAL SECURITY (Focus GROUP 1A) FINAL REPORT 50 (2003) ("[A]ttacks against network
software could disrupt or otherwise compromise critical communications or operations during
an emergency situation, or could in themselves precipitate an emergency situation."),
available at http://www.nric.org/fg/charter-vi/fgl/
Rauscher_NRICVIHomelandSecurityPhysicalSecurityFocusGrouplA FinalReport
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2. IDENTITY SPOOFING
VolP also presents hackers with increased opportunity to
misrepresent their identity to spoof caller ID mechanisms. 60  While
caller ID spoofing is possible on the PSTN, it comes "with a high price
tag: you typically [have] to be a business able to pay the local phone
company for a high-volume digital connection. ' 61 VoIP lowers the
cost of misrepresentation because spoofing capabilities are in the
possession of "ordinary netizens," rather than a large, heavily
regulated industry.
62
ID spoofing can be innocent but aggravating - for example, a VolP
user with caller ID might be tricked into answering the phone on a
"VolP Spam" call. 63  But spoofing can also pose a serious threat to
business (and therefore economic security). For example, hackers
could attempt to capture confidential business information by spoofing
caller ID in a "phishing-style attack" and masquerading as an innocent
vendor or sales group. " Alternatively, a VolP user could misrepresent
his identity to slip past authentication safeguards used bA certain
industries to prevent access to critical information or utilities.
Issue 3.doc (last accessed Apr. 4, 2005) [hereinafter NRIC PHYSICAL SECURITY FINAL
REPORT].
60 Kevin Poulsen, VolP Hackers Gut Caller ID, THE REGISTER, July 7, 2004, at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/07/hackersgutvoip/ (last accessed July 8, 2004).
61 id
62 id.
63 Cf Muraskin, supra note 50 ("Spain ... is hard to stop ... unless [a VolP user]
fundamentally limit[s] who can call [her] (which is the approach in closed networks).").
64 See Louderback, supra note 47.
65 See NSTAC CTF REPORT, supra note 5 ("[B]y spoofing address sources, unauthorized
individuals could access secure components of the PSTN via gateways."). See also Poulsen,
supra note 60 (noting that some financial institutions use Caller ID to authenticate customers
over the phone). One logical approach to preventing unauthorized access entails increasing
the level and reliability of authentication used to verify the identities and entitlements of
network participants. An experiment in the effectiveness of this approach can be seen in the
AmericaOnline Instant Messenger enhancements, which do not permit interconnection with
other instant messaging services using lower levels of authentication. From an end user
perspective, this can be very frustrating. Teenagers - the true experts in emerging technology
- perform end runs around this problem by using non-AOL instant messaging services,
thereby pointing out the weakness in the approach.
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3. ELECTRICITY DEPENDENCE
Electric power is frequently overlooked by businesses and
consumers as a critical element of telecommunications. 66 This may be
due, in part, to the fact that the electricity that travels over PSTN lines
allows conventional (i.e., non-cordless) telephones to continue
operating even during a power outage. 67 In contrast, VolP telephones
require an external power source, and as such are not as resilient
during a power outage. 68 Consequently, VolP communications during
a power outage are impacted just as data transmission is impacted.
The loss of phone communications during a power outage could
seriously disrupt businesses' recovery plans.69
To provide communications during a power outage, VoiP network
infrastructure must be connected to uninterruptible power supplies
(UPS). 70 Unfortunately, VoIP service providers may not offer backup
power. 71 Furthermore, backup power sources are not infallible,72 and
are often not designed for extended use.73  Not only must the
66 See NRIC PHYSICAL SECURITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 44.
67 Kiser & Collins, supra note 11, at 41.
68 See id. ("Because packet-switched networks do not have the same built-in power source that
circuit-switched networks do, they are far more likely to be subject to service outages."). A
new generation of technology is becoming available to address this problem, but the
technology is not widely adopted. It includes DSL modems that are line powered, and ISDN
NTl equipment which provides emergency power from the central operating center to power
digital ISDN handsets.
69 Cf PACIFIC NORTHWEST ECONOMIC REGION, "BLUE CASCADES" FINAL REPORT 3, 4 (2002)
(discussing participants' lack of contingency plans for the loss of both telephonic and internet
communication during a simulated power disruption of the Pacific Northwest region's electric
power capabilities), available at http://www.naruc.org/associations/1773/files/
bluecascades.pdf (last accessed June 24, 2004).
70 HP TECHNICAL BRIEF, supra note 28, at 5.
71 FCC.COM, supra note 1.
72 Cf Whit Allen, Power-Grid Independence Means Better Homeland Security, Global Energy
Network Institute, (Jan. 14, 2003) (discussing a risk analysis study which found that "even
robust back-up systems incorporating multiple devices (e.g., dual power feeds from the
electricity grid, batteries, diesel generators, UPS devices, etc.) run a 67 percent chance of
failure over their lifetimes"), at http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/mediacoverage/
EnergyCentral/EnergyPulse/Power-Grid-Interdependence-Means-Better-Homeland-
Security/index.shtml (last accessed Apr. 24, 2005).
[Vol. 1:2-3
FRYE & STATI
transmission and support system maintain power - the end user must
also have a source of backup power.
4. INTERCONNECTION EXPANDS SPEED & RANGE OF MALICIOUS
ATTACKS
In March 2002, the NSTAC observed the following:
[A]s the U.S. economy becomes ever more tightly connected
through telecommunications, electronic signaling systems,
power generation, information lines, financial connections,
transportation nodes, and other connections involving critical
infrastructures, possible disruptions have a far greater
potential than ever before to ripple through the economy.74
One of the greatest drawbacks to the modem economy is the speed and
distance at which problems can percolate; thus, "[p]roblems that might
have been local disturbances [can] propagate through the entire
interconnected system" before they are remedied.75 The effects of
interconnection on data networks are particularly acute: "[a]n attack on
any of the approximately 96,000 networks interconnected as the
Internet could cripple that infrastructure, and with the size of the
Internet doubling approximately every 24 months, the potential for
attack grows. ' '76  VoIP compounds this problem because it adds yet
another "on-ramp" for malicious agents to introduce disruptive forces
into the interconnected system. 77
Of course, networks are not just interconnected to each other;
eventually, they "off-ramp" at businesses, homes, and other facilities.
73 See, e.g., Kiser & Collins, supra note 11, at 41 n.213 (discussing examples of VoIP backup
power supply options, which range in use-life from thirty minutes to eight hours).
74 NSTAC VATF REPORT, supra note 49.
75 RANDAL C. PICKER, RAISING TRANSACTION COSTS AND NETWORK SECURITY: OF
HETEROGENEITY AND AUTARKY 12 (Cambridge Univ. Press) (forthcoming June, 2005).
76 NRIC PHYSICAL SECURITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 49.
77 Cf NSTAC CTF REPORT, supra note 5 ("[D]eliberate attacks are a significant factor in the
availability of Internet service today because all components are interconnected; and attacks
can be mounted from anywhere in the network.").
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Network disruptions, therefore, can cause cascading failures 71 in the
industries and communities that they are connected with and that rely
on dependable communications.7 9 The net result of tying a non-secure
infrastructure (such as VoIP) to a secure infrastructure is a weakened
networked infrastructure. 80  The following section will analyze the
potential for VoIP to affect two of the nation's most critical industry
sectors: energy and finance.
B. VoIP's VULNERABILITIES COULD CREATE CASCADING
DISRUPTIONS IN OTHER CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS
The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) recently
published a survey ranking the critical infrastructure sectors on which
various industries were most reliant.8 ' Telecommunications was
ranked first or second for seven of the nine responding industries.
82
Significantly, the energy and finance sectors ranked
telecommunications as the infrastructure on which they are most
dependent.83
78 "A cascading failure is a disruption in which one infrastructure causes a disruption in a
second [infrastructure]." James P. Peerenboom et al., Studying the Chain Reaction, ELEC.
PERSPECTIVES, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 26-27, available at http://www.naruc.org/associations/
1773/files/eperspectives.pdf (last accessed June 24, 2004).
79 See NRIC PHYSICAL SECURITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 54 ("Attacks against
Network Payload could expose companies, cities, or even countries to severe and dangerous
consequences, including disruption of emergency response and failure of systems such as air
traffic control and energy sharing grids.").
go See NETWORK RELIABILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL VI, HOMELAND DEFENSE,
FOCUS GROUP I B, (CYBERSECURITY): SUMMARY REPORT AND PROPOSALS FROM
CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES WORK COMPLETED BY FG1B BETWEEN MARCH 2002 AND
MARCH 2003, 8 (2003), available at http://www.nric.org/fg/chartervi/fgl/
FG1B front matter and-proposalsFINAL_3-13-03.doc (last accessed June 14, 2004)
[hereinafter NRIC CYBERSECURITY FINAL REPORT].
81 MARTIN G. McGUINN, NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY COUNCIL, CROSS SECTOR
INTERDEPENDENCIES AND RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE: FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COUNCIL 94 (2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/
assetlibrary/irawgreport.pdf (last accessed April 4, 2005).
82 Id.
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A rule of thumb in critical infrastructure protection is that
"[s]ecurity is [only] as strong as its weakest link.",84  Thus, the
vulnerabilities in VolP discussed above could make it the new
"weakest link" in the highly critical energy and finance sectors.
1. ENERGY SECTOR DEPENDENCY ON SECURE, RELIABLE
COMMUNICATIONS
Voice and data communications are the infrastructures on which
the energy industry is most reliant.85 Data communications provide
real-time status updates as part of the energy industry's Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and are also used for
remote control of automated devices. Voice communications,
meanwhile, are necessary to communicate with field personnel to
perform functions that cannot be remotely operated.87
A disruption of the SCADA system can have severe consequences
for regional economic security and public safety. For example, a June
1999 SCADA failure in the Pacific Northwest contributed to a pipeline
rupture, causing a leak of over 270,000 gallons of gasoline that
precipitated an environmental disaster, three deaths, and increased
gasoline prices.88  Furthermore, the systems employed to back up
SCADA, including "microwave, long and short wave radios, satellite
voice systems, [and] privately owned phone networks" 89 each have
drawbacks that either limit their implementation or reduce their
reliability during extended outage periods.
90
84 NRIC CYBERSECURITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 8.
85 McGuINN, supra note 81, at 94. See also MITRE, Electricity Technical Discussion, at
http://www.mitre.org/tech/y2k/sectors/docs/ELECTRICITYDISCUSSION.html (last
modified May 19, 2003).
86 MITRE, supra note 85.
87 id.
88 See Peerenboom, supra note 78, at 24.
89 MITRE, supra note 85.
90 See THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECuRITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
FINANCIAL SERVICES TASK FORCE REPORT 17-18 (2004), available at http://www.ncs.gov/
nstac/reports/2004/Financial %2Service%2 OTask%20Force%20Report%2O(April%202004).p
df (last accessed July 13, 2004) [hereinafter NSTAC FSTF REPORT].
2005]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
2. FINANCE SECTOR DEPENDENCE ON SECURE AND RELIABLE
COMMUNICATIONS
The financial sector is highly dependent on the
telecommunications infrastructure "to support core payment,
clearance, and settlement processes of financial institutions. ' 9  A
disruption of critical communications for just a few minutes could
seriously affect institutions' ability to continue operations.
92
Furthermore, because of the highly interconnected nature of financial
transactions, a disruption at one of the larger institutions, or of a
communications network serving several institutions, could quickly
ripple through critical financial markets.93  For these reasons,
"[e]nsuring uninterrupted telecommunications services is a critical
component of the business continuity plan of a financial institution.
'
"
94
Financial institutions recognize the need for diverse communications
mechanisms 95 to strenthen their networks' resiliency by avoiding
single points of failure. VolP - which foists formerly independent
data and voice onto the same transport channels - decreases diversity
and thus could weaken financial institutions' security.
3. A VoIP CASCADING FAILURE HYPOTHETICAL
To drive home the significance of the VoIP's security implications,
picture the following scenario. A world in the future - but not far in
the future. Terrorists monitoring the global weather systems track a
hurricane approaching the eastern seaboard. For months they have
been disguising investigative network scanning tools as Distributed
91Id. at 1.
92 Cf. Notice of Federal Reserve Board Sponsorship for Priority Telecommunication Services
of Organizations That Are Important to National Security/Emergency Preparedness, 67 Fed.
Reg. 72,957, 72958 (Dec. 9, 2002) (explaining that telecommunications services are
considered "essential where a disruption of 'a few minutes to one day' could seriously affect
continued operations on an NS/EP function").
93 See NSTAC FSTF REPORT, supra note 90, at 6.
94 Id. at 7.
95 Id. at 17-18 (explaining that alternative communications technologies, such as satellite,
laser, and microwave, could "aid in diversity assurance and telecommunications service
predictability").
96 See id. at 8-9.
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Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks on SCADA systems which are now
frequently deployed along the Internet backbone. 97 As the hurricane
approaches, they stand ready to send a modified Blaster worm through
the undetected back door they have planted in energy grids across the
nation. The hurricane hits the Outer Banks. It takes down the power
in eastern North Carolina, triggering an emergency notification in the
North Carolina SCADA system - and the deployment of the modified
Blaster worm, which cascades through the Regional Transmission
Organization network. The East Coast has lost electric power.
Emergency services personnel attempt to respond, but cannot
communicate because neither the Internet nor their VolP phones will
work - as a simultaneous Denial of Service attack has been launched
on one of the most widely deployed VolP network platforms.
98
Medical personnel likewise cannot communicate supplies and staffing
need, and hospitals are rapidly overrun and stripped of anesthetics,
sutures, and sheets.
99
A key node in the military command and control communications
system has been taken out by a strategically placed car bomb, forcing
high-level government communications back onto the public network
- which no longer works. The President cannot call the vice-President
- or anyone else - to coordinate a national response.
9 7 See, e.g., Donald I. Wallace, Smart Fields Come of Age with Internet-Based SCADA,
PIPELINE & GAS JOURNAL, Feb. 2004, at 27.
98 The Pacific Northwest Economic Region - a public/private partnership composed of
legislators, governments, and businesses in Northwestern U.S. states and Canadian provinces
- conducted a table-top exercise in June 2002 that illustrated the lack of awareness concerning
internet and phone dependence among industry and emergency response officials. This
exercise, entitled "Blue Cascades," hypothesized a physical act by terrorists directed at
disrupting the region's electric power resources, which caused follow-on disturbances in
regional communications systems. See PACIFIC NORTHWEST ECONOMIC REGION, supra note
69, at 2. Following the exercise, participants acknowledged that they had "difficulty
envisioning a situation in which they would lose telephonic and internet communication and
lacked contingency plans to work around the problem." Id. at 4 (emphasis added). See,
regarding Denial of Service attacks on VolP systems, CONTINUITY CENTRAL, VoIP:
Vulnerability over Internet Protocol?, at http://www.continuitycentral.com/feature074.htm
(last accessed Apr. 4, 2005).
99 In contrast to this doomsday prediction, there is in fact some recognition that VolP phones
should not be adopted by emergency personnel until they are proven as reliable as traditional
PSTN telephones. See, e.g., Hiltzik, supra note 16 (quoting Michael Van Norman, technology
and development manager for UCLA's Communications Technology Services Department:
"There may be some areas where the phones absolutely cannot go down ... like the hospital or
our police and fire departments. So until these issues are worked out, we don't see Internet
telephones as a replacement.").
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Chaos breaks loose in New York City and Washington, D.C. Law
enforcement calls for backup on the emergency responder point-to-
point radio systems, which run on separate frequencies from the public
network. Without electricity, however, traffic lights are no longer
functioning and routes through the congestion of those attempting to
leave the city cannot be found. Power company personnel cannot call
one another to implement/coordinate repairs. The financial markets
cease operations, causing a global economic standstill.100 Even after
response efforts do get underway, they are hindered by follow-on
Internet attacks prepared by the terrorists in advance of the initial
onslaught.101
Improbable? Perhaps. But less and less so. The bottom line:
aggregated functionality may mean increased efficiency - but it
equally means increased risk.
V. CONCLUSION: NEXT STEPS FOR IMPROVING NETWORK SECURITY
With the security problem thus identified, the natural next step is to
examine possible solutions. While VoIP introduces new
vulnerabilities to voice communications, the guiding principles for
improving security - diversity, redundancy, and autarky - are fairly
common in traditional telephony. The trend towards VolP over
private networks,10 2 rather than over the public Internet, presents the
opportunity to practice these principles. However, market forces
pushing VolP toward enhanced security may fall short of providing
100 In August 2004, some of the world's most important money-movement networks -
including FedWire - moved onto the Internet backbone. Hilary Kramer, Cyber Fears on
Fed's Web Plan, THE NEW YORK POST, Aug. 15, 2004, at http://riskman.typepad.com/
perilocity/2004/08/ (last accessed Apr. 5, 2005).
101 A real-life example of a follow-on Internet attack occurred in the weeks after September
1 lth, during which the "Nimda" worm "contribut[ed] to communication congestion and delays
experienced by emergency responders." NSTAC VATF REPORT, supra note 49.
102 See Ellen Muraskin, VOIP Is As Secure As You Make It, EWEEK.COM, May 14, 2004
("[E]nterprise IP telephony ... takes place almost exclusively over managed data networks ...
[and] therefore should not be confused with 'Voice over the Internet,' which traverses the
open, vulnerable medium[.]"), at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1592801,00.asp (last
accessed April 4, 2005). This trend is driven at least equally by private networks' enhanced
quality-of-service compared with voice transport over the Internet. See Hiltzik, supra note 16
(discussing investment in private fiber-optic networks to circumvent the public Internet to
avoid its bottlenecks).
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optimal resiliency levels; government may need to deploy incentives
to make up the "security gap.''
10 3
A. AN OVERVIEW OF SECURITY PRINCIPLES
Building a secure infrastructure does not simply entail preventing
attacks on that infrastructure. 10 4  Preventive measures frequently
cannot keep pace with technology that seeks to exploit known
vulnerabilities; as such, network managers tend to believe that106
malicious attacks are inevitable despite best efforts at prevention.'
To build a more secure infrastructure to carry both voice and data,
resiliency principles and architecture must be included as part of
"basic design precepts" of the infrastructure.'I0 7  08
Resilient networks are the combination of multiple practices.
Foremost among these is network diversity. Telecommunications
networks are diverse when data can travel separate paths to the same
endpoint, such that the failure of one route does not impact another.
10 9
Diversity is often achieved by0 separating circuit paths and
decentralizing facility connections. no
Redundancy is another method of improving network resiliency.
Redundancy practices involve maintaining alternative means of
telecommunications - such as satellite phones or microwave radios -
as backups to primary communications networks."' As the
103 NRIC PHYSICAL SECURITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 15.
104 Cf id. at 43 ("Prevention is an important aspect of any physical security plan, but that plan
will only be successful when coupled with [other mitigation strategies].").
05 See NSTAC VATF REPORT, supra note 49 (discussing the ability of hackers and other
malicious agents to develop tools to target vulnerabilities before they can be patched).
106 Ken Belson, Hackers are Discovering a New Frontier: Internet Telephone Service, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at C4. (discussing a VoIP expert's assumption that "natural or people
disasters" are not a matter of "whether" they will happen, but "when").
107 NRIC CYBERSECURITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 7.
108 NORTEL NETWORKS, WHAT'S ALL THE Fuss ABouT RESILIENCY? 2 (2004), at
http://www.nortelnetworks.com/products/01/passport/8600_rss/collateral/nn 106100-
11 1003.pdf. (last accessed June 10, 2004).
109 NSTAC FSTF REPORT, supra note 90, at 10.
110 Id. at4.
.. Id at 3, 17-18.
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telecommunications industry transforms to the next generation all IP-
based network, the legacy PSTN may serve as a sufficiently redundant
network to preserve communications resiliency. 11 2  However,
operational proficiency with the PSTN will likely decrease as IP-based
voice communications come to dominate the telecommunications
market;' 13 thus, providers will need to invest in other equally capable
redundant technologies.
Finally, significant (but costly) resiliency can be achieved by
implementing autarky in networks. Autarky is the practice of isolating
systems by severing their connection to a public network. 1 4 Autarky
used to be a common practice for managing critical information
systems. 115 In recent years, however, most key systems have moved
into the international environment. 6  Isolating critical units from
networks supporting VolP would certainly decrease businesses' total
vulnerability; however, this might also limit VoIP's capabilities (such
as its web-based features and potential for integrated information
management) that rely on interconnected data infrastructures.
B. INCENTIVES FOR SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS
VoIP service providers increasingly recognize that privately
managed data networks provide the best potential for near-term
112 Cf NSTAC CTF REPORT, supra note 5 ("[B]ecause of their large investments in public
switched telephone network (PSTN) infrastructure, carriers are initially leveraging the best of
both infrastructures.
113 Cf McGuNN, supra note 81, at 44 ("Many organizations, in making their early transitions
to Internet-based models, kept in place legacy processes in the event a fallback was required.
Over time, these processes became outdated, personnel were no longer proficient in them, or
the support infrastructure was no longer in place to manage them.").
114 Picker, supra note 75, at 5.
..1 Id. See also NRIC CYBERSECURITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 10 ("[By] [i]solating
critical components and partitioning the network infrastructure into smaller, protected areas,
the opportunity to critically affect an entire network is dramatically reduced and network
reliability is increased.").
116 One of the most recent - and significant - examples is the Federal Reserve Board's planned
introduction of"Fedline Advantage," an internet-based system intended to "extend the use of
web technology to provide access to critical payment services...." See Federal Reserve
Financial Services, Fedline Advantage is on the Horizon, FEDFocUs, May 2004, at 1,
available at http://www.frbservices.org/FedFocus/2004/FedFocus504.pdf (last accessed Sept.
17, 2004).
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improvements in quality of service1 17 and security.118 The remaining
question is how best to create incentives for business to incorporate the
aforementioned security principles - diversity, redundancy, and
autarky - into developing private networks.
Given the FCC's current reluctance to regulate, market forces will
be a considerable driver defining VolP's security profile. Customers
that rely on nearly infallible communications will demand that VoIP
meet or exceed reliability and security levels on the PSTN before
abandoning legacy systems. 19 Other highly dependent clients will
likely demand certain security baselines in their contracts with VolP
providers. 120  Additionally, as VoliP becomes ubiquitous and
substantially replaces the PSTN, tort liability for failure to provide
certain minimum services and security could prove additional impetus
for enhancements. 
121
Despite these economic drivers, a "security gap" may yet remain
between the level of protection demanded by the market and the level
of protection necessary to safeguard national economic security.122
The federal government could deploy several means to help close this
gap. First, the government may wield its considerable purchasing
power and demand baseline security measures in procurement
117 See Hiltzik, supra note 16 (discussing companies' investment in private fiber-optic
networks to circumvent the public Internet to avoid its bottlenecks).
118 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 51 (observing that a well-designed, secure corporate network
"provide[s] a strong foundation for the security of all ... IP applications, including
telephony"), available at http://www.convergedigest.com/blueprint/ttp04/
z4cisco 1.asp?ID= 141 &ctgy=4 (last accessed July 8, 2004).
119 See Hiltzik, supra note 16 (noting that VolP reliability issues prevent adoption by entities
such as hospitals, police and fire departments "where the phones absolutely cannot go
down.").
120 Cf NSTAC FSTF REPORT, supra note 90, at 3 (discussing telecommunication carriers'
practice of negotiating customer-specific diversity requirements in service contracts).
121 Cf Kiser & Collins, supra note 11, at 41 (discussing potential liability for VolP service
providers for failure to connect 911 callers to emergency centers, if these providers market
themselves as "seamless substitutes for traditional telephone service").
122 See NRIC PHYSICAL SECURITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 15. See also NSTAC
FSTF REPORT, supra note 90, at ES-1 ("[Miany telecommunications networks would need
considerable upgrades to support NS/EP [(national security / emergency preparedness)]
functionality within their larger network frameworks. At the same time, the demand for such
services is insufficient to allow the marketplace to support the specialized requirements of
NS/EP functions on a wide-scale basis.").
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contracts with VoIP providers, and in so doing help to establish the
market for secure converged network services. 123  The government
may also explore targeted tax incentives to encourage investment in
security enhancements.12 4  Finally, the government could mandate
minimum network security requirements.r25 However, given that the
market for VoIP services is still evolving, such requirements might be
both premature and in fact harmful for the future implementation of
such services. 1
26
C. VOIP'S "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY" TO ADDRESS SECURITY
CONCERNS
The good news in this discussion of VoIP's security issues and
shortcomings is that the technology is still part of a nascent industry.
A recent report found that while service is steadily expanding, VolP
telephones will not outnumber their traditional PSTN counterparts
until at least 2009.127 Thus, there is still time for best security
practices to become established and entrenched as part of standard
VoIP operating procedures. Failure to do so could have disastrous
consequences.
123 NSTAC VATF REPORT, supra note 49 ("As security standards are developed ...
Government can help establish the market by specifying those elements in contracts and
purchase orders.").
124 NSTAC FSTF REPORT, supra note 90 (suggesting tax incentives as a viable approach to
improve security).
125 Such requirements could be implemented through the FCC's Title I "ancillary jurisdiction"
authority. Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 41, 51 (2003).
12 6 See NSTAC VATF REPORT, supra note 49, at app. E ("Until the standards for packet-based
services are established ... and the Government's requirements in the evolving environment
are certain, legislation or regulation is premature."). See also Powell Statement, supra note 6,
at 7-8 ("If we do not create the proper regulatory climate in the United States, it is quite
possible our [future VoIP] local calls will be routed through Canada and Mexico at cheaper
rates, rather than through Kansas and Montana.").
127 See Ellen Muraskin, Report: VOIP Phones Won't Gain Lead Until 2009, EWEEK.COM, June
18, 2004, at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1614773,00.asp (last accessed Apr. 4,
2005).
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